Sound Bite
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union, they had an opportunity to "win the hearts and minds" of a population disaffected with their national leader. In Occupancy and Insurgency, a military history professor looks at Nazi racial, counter-partisan, and counterinsurgency policies in the context of The Hague and the Geneva Conventions and suggests that the way an occupation is carried out can create an insurgency where none existed before.
"This is an appalling, indeed chilling, solidly researched story told in brief compass." -- CHOICE
About the Author
Colin D. Heaton is a professor in history, military history and sociology at American Military University, where he has created many courses for all departments, specializing in European, African and military history, and laws of warfare. He is the senior Holocaust Studies professor in the History Department. Prof. Heaton has also taught American history, European history, Soviet/Russian history, and military history at the University of Glasgow, Campbell University (primarily adult education and Commissioned Officer Degree Completion at Jacksonville/Camp Lejeune, NC), Cape Fear Community College, and other colleges in the United States and UK. He earned his MPhil in modern European social and political history at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, where his research focused on German racial policy as a factor in German counterinsurgency doctrine in the USSR, 1941-45. Shefferton University, London, awarded Heaton an honorary postgraduate research degree in military history in 2002 for research and policy suggestions regarding the responsibilities, qualifications, and legal roles of civilian paramilitaries in conflicts according to The Hague and Geneva Conventions. This work included assisting in creating a petition to revise the Geneva Convention of 1949 to a more rational and timely legal document. He holds an MA in World History from Temple University and a BA with Honors in History from UNC-Wilmington, where he received the Thomas Mosely Award Prof. Heaton is planning a series of military biographies and studies of the laws of war with Algora Publishing. His other books include German Anti-Partisan Warfare in Europe, 1939-1945 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2001), and Nachtkrieg: The Evolution of Nocturnal Aerial Warfare, 1939-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, due Fall 2008).
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About the Book
Occupation and Insurgency details German policies towards civilians and captured military forces in the Soviet Union from 1941-1945 and examines them in the context of the laws of war. The results of these policies illustrate how an occupying...
Occupation and Insurgency details German policies towards civilians and captured military forces in the Soviet Union from 1941-1945 and examines them in the context of the laws of war. The results of these policies illustrate how an occupying force can establish a sense of legitimacy or spur a stronger resistance among the local citizens. While focused upon World War II, the book is very relevant to today's war on terror and the handling of current counterinsurgency scenarios. Evaluating certain actions by the Germans in the USSR from the standpoint of The Geneva and The Hague Conventions, the book also studies many actions that, while morally egregious, did not qualify as war crimes under the law. Some of the events analyzed prompted the 1949 revision of The Geneva Convention. The German actions, as well as the Soviet responses, lend themselves to discussion as related to international law and military actions. There is no other book that uses chronicled events to address both the international legal conventions and analyzes these events in both a legal and historical paradigm. The book is closely documented, including 20 photographs and numerous interview segments with SS officers, resistance fighters, and other primary persons involved in the war, and it provides as well the perspectives of other historians regarding the critical issues discussed. Occupation and Insurgency is a book that will appeal to all levels of academia, as well as the general public with regard to general history, World War II, and legal studies. It complements and goes beyond works such as Christopher Browning's Ordinary Men, Omer Bartov's Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich, Arad, Kurowski and Spector (eds), The Einsatzgruppen Reports, and Richard Rhodes' Masters of Death.
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This book focuses upon German racial policy as instituted with the establishment of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 and for the duration of the Third Reich under Adolf Hitler until 1945. It shows how this policy and collective mindset amongst the German officer corps and the supreme leadership hindered the development of an effective, timely, and...
This book focuses upon German racial policy as instituted with the establishment of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 and for the duration of the Third Reich under Adolf Hitler until 1945. It shows how this policy and collective mindset amongst the German officer corps and the supreme leadership hindered the development of an effective, timely, and unilateral counterinsurgency policy for the German armed forces in the Soviet Union, as well as their violations of applicable international laws which governed the conduct of the war in the east. The reader will become quite familiar with the terms 'counterinsurgency' and 'insurgent.' Counterinsurgency is, simply put, the efforts by conventional military or paramilitary forces to counter the activities of 'irregulars' (civilians operating in a paramilitary or terrorist role), whether they be 'partisans,' 'terrorists' or 'guerrillas' (see Colin D. Heaton, German Anti-Partisan Warfare in Europe, 1939-1945 for these legal distinctions) and to establish an environment of perceived stability according to existing civil or military law.1 The ruthless nature of the National Socialist racial policies and propaganda contributed heavily to the military's perception of the conquered Soviet peoples; their ingrained belief in the Rassenfeind (racial enemy) and German superiority were both factors which contributed to a false sense of security, thereby providing the military with a flawed self-perception and sense of invincibility. The failure of the German military to address the core issues sparking insurgency actions against their forces, during both the initial invasion and the occupation that followed, were primarily due to the ever-conflicting policies of segregation, forced labor, extermination, and the socially-accepted Untermenschen mentality which permeated the ranks of the Wehrmacht from top to bottom. Whilst discussing certain portions of the German military and paramilitary actions and their contributions to the Holocaust in areas of immediate concern to this book (only in relation to counterinsurgency), this book does not focus upon the Holocaust in particular, but rather will provide new insights into the failure of the NSDAP 2 and Wehrmacht on a macro-scale to comprehend the problem of civilian unrest due to German policies, and adequately alter its overall operational methodology regarding the handling of the populations in resistance. These failures in providing overt legitimacy for their actions and stabilizing the regions provided the necessary impetus for the continued and escalating resistance, forcing the Germans to re-evaluate their methods on a micro-scale in the field. This approach apparently met with some success, as opposed to the overall Armed Forces High Command macro-scale approach to reducing the threats through alternative yet conflicting actions. This book utilizes specific primary and secondary sources in the research, as well as examining German conduct towards these military and civilian populations under the existing international laws of the respective Hague and Geneva Conventions, which were both applicable. Most of the historians quoted in this book are cited for the relevance of their specific areas of research. One major historian cited is Alexander Dallin, whose works on the German occupation of the USSR (in particular the Ukraine) constitute one of the most authoritative collections within the literature. However, while Dallin discusses specific examples during the occupation, such as Odessa, 1941'1944: A Case Study of Soviet Territory under Foreign Rule, he does not delve deeply into the legal aspects of German actions and thus is not cited as thoroughly as many others.3 Another author briefly noted is Daniel Jonah Goldhagen. Judging from small excerpts of his research, Goldhagen again does not approach the international legal aspect, which is the primary focus of this research. Goldhagen is more focused upon moral and social aspects of German anti- Semitic policy as opposed to the salient military and legal considerations. This book also incorporates oral testimony from various subjects who were interviewed over the last twenty years, and who were themselves active during the war in the counterinsurgency as well as conventional military roles, thus providing individual perspectives from both Allied and Axis participants. This book also frequently cites the thesis of Dr. Benjamin Shepherd, which traverses similar terrain regarding German actions against insurgents.4 Where this work differs is in its extensive focus upon the existing international laws and its comparative analysis of German abrogation of those laws, as well as in the use of oral testimony as a supportive element to supplement the published sources. The use of interviews in writing and researching history has proven itself important in the fact that the testimony of participants, when supported by primary source evidence, and the mutually corroborating testimony from other sources, often provides previously unknown details. This method assists in either corroborating or challenging previously-held beliefs, which may have a great impact upon historical understanding. It is important to remember that the interview itself is only as viable as the source, since memories fade and the interviewed subjects will often not provide self-incriminating evidence regarding their actions. Thus the very select nature of the interviews included within this book.
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More . . .
Abstract The purpose of this book, which was researched in part at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, Scotland, is to evaluate the military and political failure of the German government under Adolf Hitler and its attempts to introduce an effective and competent counterinsurgency doctrine following the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. In addition, the legality of German military and political actions are examined according to the existing international accords that were in...
Abstract The purpose of this book, which was researched in part at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, Scotland, is to evaluate the military and political failure of the German government under Adolf Hitler and its attempts to introduce an effective and competent counterinsurgency doctrine following the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. In addition, the legality of German military and political actions are examined according to the existing international accords that were in effect during the war: primarily The Hague Convention of 1907 and Geneva Convention of 1929, with Geneva revised in 1949. Based on the relevant sources and interviews with surviving participants, it seems clear that the German violations of international law, as well as their convoluted and ever-conflicting policies regarding the handling of noncombatants, proved to be their greatest detriment. Analyzing the historiography, it becomes clear that German military necessity was subordinated to the overall political agendas of forced labor and exploitation. These policies were often at direct odds with each other, as well as with other policies the military considered necessary to win the war. Had logic dictated the actions of German forces, millions of disaffected Soviet citizens would have rallied to their liberators' cause, and Germany could have had victory in the Soviet Union. The contrasts between legitimate military operations and illegal acts committed by troops in the field provide the background for Germany's loss of perceived legitimacy amongst the conquered peoples; for the resulting hindrances faced by the military in general; and for the difficulty in formulating a universal and workable counterinsurgency doctrine suited to both military and political needs in the long term. By openly violating international law in the USSR, Germany and its leadership created a hopeless situation founded on a set of impossibly conflicting agendas. In effect, this book argues that the war against the Soviets was technically lost on the human level as soon as it began. Examining the actions of the German military, paramilitary, and political bodies, as well as their interpretation and execution of orders ' including their complete abrogation of moral, ethical, and legal responsibilities ' during the war in the USSR, Germany's failure to achieve overall success against resistance factions and the general populace disaffected with Stalinism becomes clear. The failure of the Germans to fully appreciate and implement the requirements for winning the 'hearts and minds' of the population goes to the root of the problem. Their failure to make the most of people's natural desire to be free from oppression and exploitation was their doom.
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Book News
Heaton (history, military history, and sociology; American Military U.) describes the military and political failure of the German government under Hitler to introduce an effective and competent counter-insurgency doctrine after it invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. He also examines the legality of German military and political actions in light of the international accords that were in effect at the time.
(Annotation ©2008 Book News Inc. Portland, OR)
Bryan Mark Rigg (Author, Hitler\'s Jewish Soldiers: The Untold Story of Nazi Racial Laws and Men of Jewish Descent in the German Military, and Rescued from the Reich. | More »
Bryan Mark Rigg (Author, Hitler\'s Jewish Soldiers: The Untold Story of Nazi Racial Laws and Men of Jewish Descent in the German Military, and Rescued from the Reich.
Occupation and Insurgency is a wonderfully researched book about Nazi domestic policy in the Eastern European lands Germany conquered from 1941 to 1944, a topic relatively neglected until now by military historians and Holocaust experts. Heaton’s argument shows how counterproductive the Nazi’s brutal treatment of the Slavic population was. By giving racial policy in occupied territories higher priority than the fight against Stalin, millions of potential supporters and soldiers were turned into efficient guerilla fighters who disrupted Wehrmacht supply and communications. Vlasov’s Army, a Wehrmacht unit comprising Russian volunteers led by Russian Lt. General Andrei A. Vlasov, demonstrated how willingly and effectively many Russians would fight against Stalin if given the opportunity. Unfortunately for both the Slavs and most German commanders in the East, Berlin did not appreciate the value of this demonstration. Consequently, German leaders in the Eastern territories were forced to pursue the contradictory policies of subjugating local populations and fighting Stalin’s Soviet Army. Germany dedicated enormous amounts of personnel, supplies and planning resources to suppressing these partisans, tangible assets that would have made a significant impact on the battle against Soviet troops. Had Germany treated conquered Slavs as potential allies against the murderous rule of Stalin, Germany might have won the war. In retrospect, the modern world can be thankful that this illogical and counter-productive policy contributed to Hitler’s defeat.
Contemporary military strategists and commanders can draw many rich lessons from German tactics in Russia from 1941 to 1944. UN forces face the challenge of garnering support, or at least minimizing hostility, among local populations in occupied territories every day in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Africa and possibly Iraq. Germany’s treatment of the Slavic people in Eastern Europe during World War II provides an eloquent example of how soldiers on foreign soil can turn even potentially helpful locals into the bitterest of enemies by treating them as inferior human beings. History often repeats the lesson that people defending their homes and families from foreign aggressors are motivated to fight with a degree of intensity and for lengths of time inconceivable to soldiers far from home carrying out orders with which they may or may not agree. Underestimating the importance of local public opinion in occupied territories is a costly mistake in terms of time, energy, supplies and human lives.
Otto Kumm, SS Brigadier General (Recipient, Knight\'s Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords) | More »
Otto Kumm, SS Brigadier General (Recipient, Knight\'s Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords)
The war as we knew it, or as I knew it was one of victory and defeat, conflict and terror. Commanders in the field were always victims of higher authority, unable to comprehend the realities faced by the troops on the scene, hence the occasional failure experienced by all armies.
This book is astonishing in giving an objective opinion regarding German operations in the Soviet Union, with no visible prejudice or agenda attached.
Despite the legacy of our operations in total, I have never doubted the basic integrity of my soldiers of the Waffen SS. Yes, it is true that propaganda played a major role in our actions and opinions. However, it would be inaccurate to assume that most of us did not apply a moral and ethical program to fighting our enemies. Tragedies happened, of that there is no doubt. Heaton clearly outlines these abominations, attributed to both Germans and Soviets, using international law as the measuring stick.
I hope that important lessons are learned from this work so that warfare, despite its brutal nature, is never again an abomination.
Albert H. Wunsch III, Esq. | More »
Albert H. Wunsch III, Esq.
[When the Germans] pretended to justify heinous acts of barbarism in the name of the law...[they] emboldened the civilian populations of the occupied regions to resist....
In Occupation and Insurgency Colin Heaton shows that the German strategic objectives were not going to be held hostage to the alleged counterproductive precepts of international law. Hitler routinely flaunted the fact that he would sign anything in good faith one day, and unhesitatingly break it soon after in the name, and on behalf of, the future of the German people. Treaties and laws were mere scraps of paper that were observed as long as they legitimized Hitler’s interests. Accordingly, The Hague and Geneva Conventions then in effect were carefully scrutinized by the Germans and selectively utilized when in harmony with Nazi ends and means.
The German legal advisors, as demonstrated in the book, were master manipulators of the law. They were adept at interpreting treaty provisions and laws which facilitated German purposes. Loopholes and caveats were their specialties. For instance, the Germans were quick to point out that Stalin never ratified either The Hague or Geneva Conventions, thus making German adherence to the same unnecessary in matters concerning the Soviet Union.
Good lawyers have the ability to craft definitions, create distinctions, find escape clauses, selectively enforce provisions, keyhole, pigeonhole and cleverly dilute existing law to the benefit of their client. They try their case before a judge and duly sworn jury, and await the verdict and react to the outcome accordingly. If they win they celebrate; if they lose, sometimes they appeal.
As described in Occupation and Insurgency, the good lawyers of the High Command practiced all of the above, but in a more deadly fashion. The pens became swords; the courtrooms became battlefields, streets and villages. The soldiers assumed the roles of judges and juries, as well as ultimately, executioners. There were no appeals. The Germans conveniently created a legal fiction which distorted accepted judicial principles and pretended to justify heinous acts of barbarism in the name of the law.
Colin Heaton has succeeded in analyzing this perversion of international law. He convincingly and succinctly demonstrates the initial shrewdness exercised by the German High Command in legal matters surrounding the occupation of the Eastern territories. He also points out and correctly concludes that this legal manipulation and ingenuity served no legitimate purpose other than to undermine the German war effort. It emboldened the civilian populations of the occupied regions to resist, and it was this stiff resistance which successfully diverted German resources and manpower from other major fronts and duties.
In the German quest to subdue and manipulate the rules which provided the foundation for the international legal system, the High Command became blind to the victims of their so-called legally justifiable actions. The German mastery of this illegitimate rationalization and subsequent implementation, as Prof. Heaton documents, cost them the war. Given the current international “war on terror”, the involvement of United States forces on many fronts, their problems with indigenous personnel, and the ever changing political climate which governs these actions, this book may provide a guideline for both sides: those choosing to remove terror, and those wishing to implement it. In the end, it will be the rule of law which decides who was moral and ethical.
CHOICE September 2009 | More »
CHOICE September 2009
The German Wehrmacht expected a quick victory in the war launched against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. But victory eluded the Germans. Stalin threw men, women, and children ("cogs") into delaying actions, caring not a whit about losses. Heaton (American Military Univ.), however, believes that the Germans carried the seeds of their eventual defeat with them from the start of the invasion: the arrogant Germans went east harboring a poisonous, racist ideology in which Slavic peoples were "subhuman." Consequently, the Germans at all levels ignored niceties such as The Hague and Geneva Conventions, turning the welcoming masses in western Russia into a massive force of bloodthirsty partisans waging a no-holds-barred war on the invaders who, in turn, used ever more Draconian measures to maintain their lines of communication.
This is an appalling, indeed chilling, solidly researched story told in brief compass (138 pages), featuring numerous block quotations, with 754 notes at the back of the book. Supporting Heaton's analysis is a 66-page bibliography, two appendixes, illustrations, and comments about the book by three authorities, one of them SS Brigadefiihrer Otto Kumm. This unusual book will interest WW II specialists and students of German and Russian history. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Graduate students, faculty.
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Pages 274
Year: 2008
LC Classification: D804.G4H35
Dewey code: 940.53'370947'dc22
BISAC: HIS027100 HISTORY / Military / World War II
BISAC: HIS027060 HISTORY / Military / Strategy
Soft Cover
ISBN: 978-0-87586-609-3
Price: USD 24.95
Hard Cover
ISBN: 978-0-87586-610-9
Price: USD 34.95
eBook
ISBN: 978-0-87586-611-6
Price: USD 24.95
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