Sound Bite
This book is a critical account, written as it occurred, of the first phase of the war on terror. It is composed of newspaper columns discussing that 'war,' and with the events and forces influencing it or provoked by it.This collection begins with a column written the afternoon of September 11, 2001, and ends with those written in December 2003. The articles cover the lead up to the attack on Iraq, the war in Iraq, and the political and economic directions the US has taken since then. A world-renowned journalist, William Pfaff then discusses the geopolitical implications for Europe and the rest of the world.The Iraq War was waged for several different reasons and success in Iraq has been measured by many different criteria. But regardless of any military progress and battles won, regardless of the casualties in Iraq and the loss of international prestige that has accompanied embarassing episodes, most Americans never really considered the possibility that the US could lose the political struggle in Iraq, a defeat that would cast into question the significance of the War against Terror and America's role as the 'sole superpower.' If America is there to re-shape the Middle East and "bring democracy and freedom," what are the implications for America as the elected government asks us to get out of Iraq?
About the Author
William Pfaff's reflections on politics and contemporary history have appeared in The New Yorker since 1971. He writes a column for the International Herald Tribune, in Paris, syndicated by the Los Angeles Times. His books include The Wrath of Nations, Condemned to Freedom, andBarbarian Sentiments which was a National Book Award finalist and in French translation won the City of Geneva's Prix Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the best political work in 1989-1990. He is the former deputy director of the Hudson Institute's European affiliate, and before that was an officer of the Free Europe organization. He is a former editor of Commonweal magazine.
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About the Book
After September 11, 2001, it was easy to forget the economic uncertainties of the preceding summer, the obvious flaws in the presidential election of 2000, and other brewing problems. But the weaknesses are still with...
After September 11, 2001, it was easy to forget the economic uncertainties of the preceding summer, the obvious flaws in the presidential election of 2000, and other brewing problems. But the weaknesses are still with us, and a crack-down on liberties may not be the best answer. Pfaff's columns provide insights into the shifting international dynamics and the reasons why Europeans - and many Americans - distrust what appears to be a newly aggressive American imperialism. He also discusses NATO and other institutions that we have relied upon to help craft a peaceful and cooperative future. FEAR, ANGER AND FAILURE is a critical account of the 'war on terror' and the events and forces influencing it or provoked by it, composed of newspaper columns dating from the afternoon of September 11, 2001, and ending in late December, 2003. These articles discuss American policy and personalities but also the dramatic change the Bush administration's conduct has produced in Washington's relations with its European allies. These articles deal with American policy and personalities but also with the dramatic change the Bush administration's conduct has produced in Washington's relations with its European allies. The Israeli-Palestinian struggle, crucial to American interests in the Middle East, was necessarily a part of these dynamics. The defeat in Baghdad was implicitly acknowledged by President George W. Bush when he announced on November 14, 2003 that the process by which American Occupation authorities in Iraq would hand power over to Iraqi authorities would be accelerated, with a target date of June 2004. The dream of Mr. Bush and his advisers was that a dramatic democratic transformation of Iraq could be accomplished, provoking quasi-revolutionary political change elsewhere in the Arab Moslem world, accelerating modernizing forces in Islamic society as a whole. Even before the capture of Saddam Hussein failed to improve the situation, this policy was proven to be what its critics had always said it was, a na�¯ve, sentimental, a-historical and utopian illusion.
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(excerpts)There has been little or no discussion at the level of national politics and policy of the possibility that the U.S. might lose the Iraq war. There is an all but universal assumption that American power will in the end crush anything that resists it'¦. It is true that critics have warned of a 'new Vietnam,' but nearly always in...
(excerpts)There has been little or no discussion at the level of national politics and policy of the possibility that the U.S. might lose the Iraq war. There is an all but universal assumption that American power will in the end crush anything that resists it'¦. It is true that critics have warned of a 'new Vietnam,' but nearly always in terms that suggested only that the eventual victory might be more difficult and costly than the Bush government expected. The Vietnam analogy is indeed mistaken in military terms. The insurgents in Iraq are not an organized and disciplined national movement, supported and supplied with arms and leadership from a sister-country across the border, itself within a nuclear sanctuary (as was the case with North Vietnam, allied with both the Soviet Union and China). The relevant analogy Vietnam offers, with respect to the present situation in Iraq, is a political one. The Bush administration seems blind to the political lesson of Vietnam, which ' translated into contemporary terms ' is that no leader will be capable of rallying Iraq, or its major religious or ethnic components (except the minority Kurds), whose program is not national sovereignty, an end to American occupation, and national renewal on Iraq's own terms ' which means full control of its resources, its security, and its foreign policy. That is not what the Bush administration has envisaged. The vital political forces in Iraq will inevitably develop in opposition to the American occupation, and in opposition to the United States itself so long as larger American policies in the Middle East, and elsewhere in the Moslem world, generate massive popular opposition. This is simply a fact of political life and historical process. In Vietnam, frustrated by the inability of the Catholic mandarin and nationalist the U.S. had brought back from U.S. exile to install in power, Ngo Dinh Diem, to defeat Vietnam's Communist uprising, the Kennedy administration instigated a military coup to remove him, and acquiesced in his murder. Yet Diem actually represented a real national force, the educated Catholic middle classes and political elites that had run the country when it was a French colony. However, they represented too small a segment of the population and were too politically compromised by colonialism to deal with the dynamic combination of peasant nationalism and Marxist utopianism that drove the Communist National Liberation Front. Washington replaced Diem with a general, the first in a series. One after another, each in turn failed, essentially because each was seen as defending the interests and ideas of the United States against those of Vietnamese nationalism. Eventually, the Nixon administration abandoned the last of these generals, Nguyen Van Thieu, and formally withdrew from the war, calling this 'Vietnamization.' When Saigon fell, two years later, President Nixon blamed the U.S. Congress and the liberal press. In Iraq, the Bush administration is still in search of its Ngo Dinh Diem.
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More Information
Sound Bite Americans did not really consider the possibility that the US could lose the political struggle in Iraq, a defeat that would cast into question the significance of the War against Terror and America's modern role as the 'sole superpower.' Pfaff pokes holes in our 'utopian illusions' and pleads for a more rational view.
Sound Bite Americans did not really consider the possibility that the US could lose the political struggle in Iraq, a defeat that would cast into question the significance of the War against Terror and America's modern role as the 'sole superpower.' Pfaff pokes holes in our 'utopian illusions' and pleads for a more rational view.
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Russell Baker of The New York Times | More »
Russell Baker of The New York Times
"For page after page, in article after article, William Pfaff was saying what should have been said week after week as Bush's cheery civilian warriors marched us into the Middle East. Really splendid work."
International Herald Tribune, Book Review | More »
International Herald Tribune, Book Review
Newspaper columnists always have a difficult choice to make. Is it better to be unexpected, challenging, entertaining - or relentless, consistent and right? For more than a quarter of a century now, William Pfaff, the trenchant columnist whose work has appeared in the International Herald Tribune, has opted for rectitude rather than entertainment. His crunching prose and unflinching judgments need to be borne out by events. And happily - or unhappily for our troubled world - Pfaff's touch has never been surer than in the years since Sept. 11, 2001. No other Western columnist has steered quite such a steady course. What, in the hours after the twin towers fell, was the most profound lesson? "That the only real defense against external attack is a serious, continuing and courageous effort to find political solutions for national and ideological conflicts that involve the United States." What, just a day later, did he make of the war on terrorism? "Missiles are blunt weapons. Terrorists - these terrorists - are smart enough to make others bear the price for what they have done, and exploit the result." Pfaff knew all about Osama bin Laden, and the tumultuous causes within Islamic society that rally Wahhabi Muslims. He saw the attack on America as specific, for clear purpose, rather than random. He protested when all terrorist movements, national, regional, great and small, were rolled mindlessly into a single foggy monster. He kept Israelis and Palestinians to one side, only involving them when a hapless White House followed Ariel Sharon's lead. And Iraq? It was farce. "Like Freedonia going to war in 'Duck Soup' except that the Marx Brothers meant to be funny - the lugubrious diplomatic nadir, surely, was the British proposal that war might be called off if Saddam Hussein went on television to say "sorry." It was politically appalling. "The neo-conservatives are fanatics. They believe it worth killing for unproven ideas. Traditional morality says that war is justified in legitimate defense. Totalitarian morality justifies wars to make people or societies better." It would be, and is, a terrible defeat. "There is indeed a war of civilization going on, but it is taking place inside Muslim society. The West is a crude interloper … and the United States a detonator of explosions primed by cultural and poetical frustration. It imagines that it brings progress, but all it has brought so far is deepened chaos." This collection of pieces ends in December 2003, but absolutely nothing that has happened since disrupts Pfaff's basic theses. On the contrary, the outside events of Falluja and Najaf, like the inside events at Abu Ghraib prison, only lend them more sickening credence. Right and right and right again. Of course, from time to time, you can quibble. Afghanistan isn't remotely over, but it wasn't the tough nut of initial warnings. NATO hasn't self-destructed on cue. Perhaps instinctively Pfaff always looks on the dark side for his takes on life, and just occasionally the worst fails to happen. But these, in context, are only quibbles, straws swept easily away. Pfaff's publishers haven't done this collection many favors, to be sure. The old columns are slovenly shoveled into print, not reorganized for clarity. The short paragraphs that work well in daily newspapers seem irritatingly small here. So, say three out of 10 for presentation, and nine out of 10 for steam-rollering, triumphant argument. The publishers' puffs boldly liken Pfaff to Walter Lippman and George Kennan. For once, they don't push their luck too far. His sense of history, his ability to put different strands together, is exemplary. His writing base, in France, gives him a perspective that spans the Atlantic with true, urgent fervor. His is a unique voice, demanding to be heard. I can never, for the life of me, see why other, more fallible commentators, sitting in Washington or New York, are revered in the United States while Pfaff, faraway and often unread, lectures a wider but less cohesive world. I can never, either, see why the legions of Fox TV and Rupert Murdoch equate liberalism with wishy-washy scrabblings after belief. William Pfaff may be a liberal in this artificial pantheon, but there is nothing wishy-washy about his bugle calls and laments. He is precisely what his foes consider themselves to be: a realist. If newspapers are, traditionally, the "first rough draft of history," then he's a remarkable instant historian. The man who got it right.
Reviewed by Peter Preston (IHT) Thursday, May 13, 2004
Los Angeles Times, Book Review | More »
Los Angeles Times, Book Review
COLLECTIONS of newspaper essays, let alone op-eds, are usually dreary affairs. What was dashed off for a provocative read over breakfast becomes, more often than not, a prolonged exercise in tedium by the time it is immured between hard covers. William Pfaff's "Fear, Anger and Failure" is a notable exception. A longtime columnist for the International Herald Tribune, Pfaff has lived for decades In Paris, where he has followed the turbulent relationship between Europe and the United States. In this compilation of essays about the Bush administration and neoconservative influence since Sept. 11, he offers a look at U.S. foreign policy that is comprehensive, illuminating — and ultimately mistaken. Unlike some of the more boisterous pundits who championed the liberation of Iraq only to sidle away as it looked like an increasingly iffy proposition, Pfaff, as these writings make clear, has always been skeptical of the administration's case for the war on terror, beginning with Afghanistan. He underestimates the ease with which the U.S. military could topple the Taliban, but he warns that if the local population sees Osama bin Laden "as the victim of foreign intruders, and collaborates in resisting Chat intrusion, Western soldiers are unlikely to track him down. He probably could hold out indefinitely, and perhaps eventually disappear." Nothing troubles Pfaff more than the breakdown in transatlantic relations and what he sees as the neoconservatives' ham-handed attempt to divide Europe. He defends German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who decried President Bush's plans for war during his reelection campaign In fall 2002: "Washington drove the Germans ... into the arms of the French." He would like to see a united Europe, led by France and Germany, which might offer more than taken resistance to U.S, alms. For Pfaff, few words are more contemptible than "neo-conservative." To him, it represents all that has been and remains wrong with U.S. foreign policy: the impulse to crusade abroad on behalf of freedom, no matter how insalubrious the prospects for liberal democracy. "Advocates of American empire are usually seduced by the notion that Washington's imperial authority would be accepted as positive, and that the empire would therefore be consensual," he writes. The current morass In Iraq is precisely what Pfaff and other adversaries of neo-conservatism predicted. Certainly, Bush's declaration in a November 2003 speech to the National Endowment for Democracy that 'the establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution" seems like a pious hope rather than firm reality. Indeed, Bush administration officials, including national security advisor Rice, have retreated from talk of creating democracy and instead embrace the idea of a stable Iraqi regime* and Iraqi leaders gave themselves the power to impose martial law after the June 28 transfer of power. Unfortunately, Pfaff's disdain for neoconservatives is so palpable that he never offers much beyond a caricature. Pfaff's criticisms may be acidulous, but his remedy is less than persuasive. He makes much of the realist tradition in U.S. foreign policy, whose champions include columnist Walter Lippmann, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr and diplomat-historian George F. Kennan. That tradition shuns overt, moralism, shrinks from such terms as "good" and "evil" and maintains that true statesmen should, as far as possible, define their nation's interests quite narrowly. Kennan may have been the author of the anti-communist containment doctrine, but he soon disowned it. He has warned against a Manichean conception of international affairs, beginning with the truculent stance of former secretary of State John Foster Dulles down to George W. Bush & Co. The results of realist thinking, however, have not always been happy. One secretary of State who adhered strictly to this conception of foreign affairs was Henry Kissinger. He venerated great power politics and scorned human rights concerns. The first Bush administration displayed a similar proclivity for realist tenets in refusing to intervene in the Balkans to stop the depreciations of Slobodan Milosevic's marauding Serbs and allowing Saddam Hussein, in the aftermath of the first Gulf War, to slaughter the Kurds and Shiites. Pfaff, however, believes that utopianism "permeates the rhetoric and thinking of Republicans and Democrats alike." He is as much an enemy of traditional democratic universalism as of crusading conservatism. He chastises former President Clinton for intervening abroad and calls upon the nation's leaders to abandon the delusion that the country can serve as a model for the world. Essentially, he would have the United States behave like a chastened power that acknowledges the limits of its military capabilities and tries to muddle through, while a revitalized Europe checks any incipient US megalomania. If the United States were a declining power, Pfaff’s prescriptions might make sense. But it isn't, and they don't. France can't field an aircraft carrier. Germany faces a crushing welfare burden as its population ages. The United States may have tested the limits of its power in Iraq, but it suffers from few of Europe's ailments. Pfaff would like a united Europe, led by France, to regain great power status. You might say that Pfaff, whose reflections carry a distinct whiff of hauteur, has gone native. The State Department has a sensible policy of rotating its foreign service officers every few years to avoid precisely this danger. A stateside stint might do him good. After all these decades in Paris, his reflections are the product of an era of faded glory. And the notion that Europe can, or will, act as a check on the United States is a pipe dream. Nor would Democrat John Kerry or a second-term Bush administration be well advised to adopt realist tenets. It is not clear that realism is always realistic. The United States faces threats from abroad that it can't afford to ignore. What's more, promoting human rights has not only been a worthy goal in itself; it also has helped create more stable governments in the Philippines and elsewhere. To substitute a new set of Illusions about foreign affairs would compound the difficulties confronting the United States. Pfaff has perceptively chronicled the follies on the road to Iraq only to counsel a dangerous amoralism in their stead.
By Jacob Heilbrunn
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Pages 284
Year: 2003
LC Classification: HV6432.P49
Dewey code: 973.931'dc22
BISAC: POL011000
BISAC: HIS036070
Soft Cover
ISBN: 978-0-87586-254-5
Price: USD 22.95
Hard cover:
ISBN: 978-0-87586-255-2
Price: USD 28.95
Ebook:
ISBN: 978-0-87586-200-2
Price: USD 28.95
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