The Evolution of Electoral and Party Systems in the Nordic Countries

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Illustrating how changing laws can shape future elections, each chapter in this collection narrates the history of, and the largely partisan political maneuvering behind, the evolution of electoral laws in the five Nordic countries.Because the chapters are written to a common overall outline, and include a number of standard tables, they have an unusually high degree of comparability ' a great asset.

About the Book

This work discusses and shows through statistics how the choice and design of electoral system/changes in electoral systems can have significant and lasting direct consequences for party proliferation, proportionality of party representation, racial representation, within-party and cross-party competition and collusion, voter turnout, and incentives to cultivate a personal vote through particularistic appeals.Bernard Grofman has edited or co-edited sixteen books, three with Arnold Lijphart. Two of their collaborations won the Hallett Prize of the American Political Science Association (the prize is granted for works that have proved to have a lasting impact in the field, at least ten years beyond the date of publication: Lijphart and Grofman, Choosing an Electoral System, 1984; Grofman and Lijphart, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, 1986).This volume is one of four collections on electoral systems originating in Conferences on Political Economy at the University of California at Irvine. The others deal with elections using the single non-transferable vote (Michigan, 1999), single transferable vote (Michigan, 2000), and mixed-member arrangements (Oxford, 2000).Many political scientists in English-speaking countries tend to think of Proportional Representation in terms of the underlying concepts of proportionality and examples that institutionalize it in relative pure form, such as Israel. Reading these chapters, one gains a more sophisticated understanding of the variety and complexities of real PR systems, including the interaction of geographical representation with the principle of proportionality, the practical stakes behind the seemingly technical choice of allocation formulas, the origin of the "modified" St. Lagu« divisors, the functioning of apparentement and other vote-pooling devices, the interaction of strategic advantage and normative principles in the development of the Proportional Representation systems, the role of partisan manipulation, etc.A model of comparative, cumulative political science, and of "embedded system" research design, the book is part of a major project by both Grofman and Lijphart to bring a vast improvement in rigor and systemicity in the analysis of electoral laws and their impacts.Each chapter offers a narration of the history of, and political (largely partisan) maneuvering behind, the evolution of electoral laws in the five Nordic countries. In this respect, it is in the tradition of A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe, by Carstairs, 1980 (out of print). Yet, it differs from that work, and represents a significant advance on it, by focusing on fewer countries and thus going into greater depth and wider history span.Table of Contents1. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, Introduction2. Jorgen Elklit, Denmark3. Jan Sundberg, Finland4. Olafur Hardarrson, Iceland5. Bernt Aardal, Norway6. Bo Sarlvik (with the assistance of Peter Eisaisson and Ola Jodal), Sweden

Introduction

The focus of this volume is on the uses of and consequences of various forms of list proportional representation, [illustrating principles and electoral techniques which apply as well in other countries] in the five Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. This work is largely focused on discussion and statistics analyzing how the choice and design of electoral system/changes in electoral systems can have significant and lasting direct consequences for party proliferation, proportionality of party representation, racial representation, within-party and cross-party competition and collusion, voter turnout, and incentives to cultivate a personal vote through particularistic appeals. Moreover, through effects on the numbers of parties and/or on the structure of ideological representation and/or on within-party and cross-party competition, change of election systems can have indirect effects on other important aspects of politics such as Cabinet durability, with PR systems tending to have lower cabinet tenure in office than single member district systems using plurality. Electoral rules that appear identical may significantly differ in their consequences when we consider variations such as in the average number of representatives elected per district or in national vote thresholds, or nomination procedures, or in even more fine-grain features such as rules restricting campaigning or rules that affect how easy it is for independent candidates to run. Election systems cannot be understood as operating in a vacuum. Their effects are mediated by other aspects of political institutions and political culture,5 as well as past history and the shape of party constellations. Seemingly identical electoral rules may give rise to very different types of outcomes in different political settings. Moreover, electoral institutions have ramifications that extend beyond the immediate electoral arena. The full effects of changes in electoral systems may not occur immediately, since it may take time for key actors to realize the nature of the behaviors that constitute optimizing strategies in the new system. See also Coleman (1972) on the effects of party primaries on the ideological structure of two-party competition. For example, Geddes (1995: 269), in her discussion of the prospects for democracy in Eastern Europe, observes that perceptions of government as 'disorderly, inefficient, irritating, opportunistic, squabbling and petty . . . . are likely to be exaggerated in countries in which electoral institutions, such as the open list in Poland and single-member districts in Hungary, undermine party discipline.' (However, Geddes also notes that '(l)ow opinions of government, especially the legislature, are common even in long-lived stable democracies.') It is also worth noting that choice of electoral systems appears closely linked to other aspects of constitutional design (see esp. Lijphart's 1984, 1999 discussion of the features of the Westminster model versus the consensus model).Changes in election systems may give rise to equilibrating forces that moderate the consequences of the changes as voters, candidates and parties adapt their behavior to the new institutional environment in ways that compensate for the changes, so as to partially restore significant elements of the status quo ante. The geographic distribution of partisan support is a key intermediating factor that shapes the extent to which electoral institutions (or changes in them) affect outcomes, especially electoral fairness in the translation of votes into seats.